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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Venting due to overpressure of a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
76
Quality
Description

A liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling back to the base terminal after having delivered at a customer site. Almost arrived to the end of the journey, the tanker started to vent. The drivers pulled over and checked pressure gauges, reading a 55 lbs value (probably 3.8 barg). The hydrogen vapour vented for about 1 minute and stopped when the pressure was at 38 lbs (probably 2.6 barg). The drivers proceeded to the base terminal. Once there, the inspection determined that the tanker had lost insulation capacity to vacuum deterioration.
The tanker was warmed up with warm gas and purged with inert nitrogen and sent to another company site for testing. There they found that the external shell of the tank was not able to maintain the required vacuum quality. The tanker was then transported to company headquarter for further diagnosis and repair before returning to service.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
PRD (valve)
Failure mode
correct activation & venting
Initiating cause
over-pressurisation (thermal insulation degradation)
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIAL CAUSE was the deterioration of the vacuum between the inner vessel and outer vessel of the LH2 tank on the trailer, wit consequence loss of thermal isolation ability and over-pressurisation of the tank.

ROOT CAUSE: additional information of the reasons for the loss of vacuum is not provided.

Root causes
Unknown
Date entry in HIAD
31/12/2024

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

vacuum thermal insulation

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
highway or similar
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The tank was almost empty after delivery. The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) ,
The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) , but to the hydrogen gas left in the tank before venting. .

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
10
Post-event summary

A loss of 1130 GCF is reportd, which probably corresponds to 2.9 kg

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

This incident is very similar to other, such as the HIAD_070, which attributed to road vibrations the opening of the vapour return valve.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release pressure [MPa]
0.36
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
PHMSA
Reference & weblink

Event incident ID I-1991090456 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages
(accessed September 2024)