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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Release from a hydrogen line to the desulphurization unit of a refinery

Event

Event ID
840
Quality
Description

A sudden failure occured on a hydrogen line of a refinery desulphurisation unit. The equipment was located between a hydrogen compressor and its overpressure protection valve. It was equipped with an automatical isolation system, however, the failed pipe, located at the bottom of the system, was without self-draining mechanism. .

The bursting of the pipe was due to its corrosion: a large loss of thickness extended over 300 mm. The presence of a bend at a low point on a line without circulation led to the accumulation of deposits initiating a corrosion mechanism.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Component involved
pipe (bend)
Failure mode
rupture, no ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (internal corrosion / erosion)
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIATING CAUSE was corrosion which reduced the stress-bearing wall thickness of the pipe.

The ROOT CAUSE was found in a non-optimal design, failing to identify and taking care of weak points on the line.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2020

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

hydrogen line of a refinery desulphurization unit

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
medium to high pressure (10 to 50 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Emergency action

The pipe was isolated automatically.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The valve inlet lines were similar to dead arms and should have been considered as such when establishing inspection plans. They must be the subject of the corresponding enhanced controls;
2. The lines should be as short as possible and self-draining.

Corrective Measures

The operator modified the layout of the piping to avoid low points. It performed thickness checks on lines identified as sensitive.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
ARIA
Reference & weblink

ARIA data base
event no. 51671