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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Pressure increase in a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
425
Quality
Description

A liquid hydrogen tanker was returning to the base after having deliver data customer site. The tank was empty. Nevertheless, on the road the drivers noticed a continuing elevated pressure. To avoid the possibility of having the safety vents open while traveling, they decided to pull off the road and perform a controlled, manual venting .
Not having a customer "safe haven" within the immediate area, and after having seen an pressure increase from 47 to 51 psi within 10 minutes, they decided to make a controlled venting alongside an isolated section of the highway.
The drivers followed their standard venting safety protocol, and after approximately 3 minutes of venting, the tanker pressure had dropped to an acceptable 13 psi. After having waited for approximately 60 minutes, noting no significant pressure increases, they restarted the travel.
3 hours later, they had to perform again the same procedure, reducing the pressure from 26 psi to 13 psi.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
LH2 tank (road tanker)
Failure mode
manual venting
Initiating cause
unknown
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIAL was an increase of the pressure inside the LH2 trailer.
The ROOT CAUSE was probably a reduction of the thermal isolation capacity of the tank external shell, but the PHMSA does not explicitly state so.

Root causes
Unknown
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2017

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

over-pressure

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
highway or similar
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The LH2 tanker had a capacity of 3890 kg, but it was almost empty, containing only gaseous hydrogen

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
43
Post-event summary

Only 2.5 kg went lost during the manual ' stabilisation' venting.

Emergency action

The increase in pressure was handled by performing a manual venting which brought back the pressure to a value lower than the nominal one.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The safe systems and procedures worked as expected. The increase in pressure was probably due to a decrease of the thermal isolation capacity of the tank external shell.
For these cases, in this type of LH2 trailer-tractor the drivers could continuously monitor the pressure from inside the cabin, and notified the head quarter, receiving instructions. They were trained in performing a procedure called in jargon a ‘ stabilisation’ of the tank pressure, consisting in a manual venting aiming at reducing the pressure well below the nominal value.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount (kg)
2.5
Release pressure [MPa]
0.42
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
PHMSA
Reference & weblink

Incidents I-1999110008 and I-1999110007 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA:
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%…
(accessed September 2024)

Incidents I-1999110008 and I-1999110007 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA:
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%…
(accessed September 2024)