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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
373
Quality
Description

An empty liquid Hydrogen tanker was returning to the base terminal from a delivery at a space centre. At the departure, the internal vessel pressure was 8 psig. At the first safety check, the pressure had raised to 20 psig. At the second safety check (after approximately 240 miles), the pressure had risen to 42 psig. At this moment, the drivers received instruction to move the vehicle to a safe location and perform a controlled venting to reduce the pressure to 30 psig. The pressure remained at an acceptable level for the remainder of the trip.
An inspection of the unit revealed that the rise in pressure was due to moisture being released into the annular space from internal getters. The trailer was put out of service and corrective maintenance was performed to remove all excess moisture from the annular space.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
LH2 tank (road tanker)
Failure mode
manual venting
Initiating cause
over-pressurisation (thermal insulation degradation)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIAL CAUSE was the unexpected increase of the internal pressure of the liquid hydrogen vessel after the start of the travel.
This event could be classified as a near miss, because the hydrogen released to the environment was part of mitigating measures foreseen by the procedure.
Nevertheless, it is classified as an incident because the ROOT CAUSE was identified in the loss of thermal isolation capacity of the vacuum annular layer, due to condensation of moisture present in the vacuum system itself (getters).

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
16/11/2024

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

LH2 tank overpressure

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
highway or similar
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The tanker was empty, having just delivered hydrogen to a customer site. Only gaseous hydrogen, no LH2 was left.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
200
Post-event summary

5.5 kg of hydrogen were released.

Emergency action

A manual hydrogen vent was executed to reduce (in jargon 'to stabilise") the vapour pressure inside the LH2 tank. The drivers could handle the emergency alone.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Presence of condensed phase in the annular vacuum space of a cryogenic tank is something that was not considered possible, and that has been found out by the practice. It is not known if and witch remedial measures were taken.

Corrective Measures

The trailer was put out of service and corrective maintenance was performed to remove all excess moisture from the annular space.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
PHMSA
Reference & weblink

Report I-1994021002 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA:
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%…
(accessed September 2024)