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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
371
Quality
Description

A full liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling from the home terminal to deliver to a customer, when the drivers noticed a pressure rise during a safety check. The drivers called in and were instructed to return to the home terminal (about 20 miles from the terminal). The drivers again stopped to check the tanker pressure and realised that a release was imminent. The terminal was called again and the drivers were instructed to secure the vehicle in a remote location and control the tanker pressure until terminal personnel could respond.
When the terminal personnel arrived, the tanker was vented and stabilized at 5 pounds of pressure.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the tanker had been overloaded by the plant operator resulting in a pressure rise. Training and loading procedures have been reviewed and personnel retrained to prevent any re-occurrence of this type of incident.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
LH2 tank (road tanker)
Failure mode
manual venting
Initiating cause
over-pressurisation (over-filling)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIAL CAUSE was the unexpected increase of pressure after the start of the travel.
This event could be classified as a near miss, because the hydrogen release to the environment was part of mitigating measures foreseen by the procedure.

Nevertheless, it is classified as incident because the ROOT CAUSE lies in the over-filling occurred when filling the tank before travelling, something that should not be allowed by the procedure or by automatic safeguards.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
16/11/2024

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

LH2 tank overpressure

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
highway or similar
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The tanker was empty, having just delivered hydrogen to a customer site. Only gaseous hydrogen, no LH2 was left.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
71
Post-event summary

A negligible amount of hydrogen was released.

Emergency action

A manual hydrogen vent was executed to reduce (in jargon 'to stabilise") the vapour pressure inside the LH2 tank. The drivers could handle the emergency alone.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

This incident is remarkable, because apparently it has been possible to over-fill the liquid hydrogen trailer tank, something that should be made impossible by procedures and/or automatic safeguards.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
PHMSA
Reference & weblink

Report I-1994101085 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA:
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%…
(accessed September 2024)