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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Malfunctioning in a hydrogen refuelling station

Event

Event ID
404
Quality
Description

At a refuelling station for buses, the first dispenser had been taken out of operation, because leaking (see HIAD event 403). Another dispenser was being used. Fuelling was taking too long and was very slow. The producer was called and it was found that the solenoid valves were not opening correctly due to a lack of compressed air.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
No Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Component involved
valve (generic)
Failure mode
malfunctioning
Initiating cause
conventional component failure (compressed air)
Root CAUSE analysis

It was found that a snap connector on an air line in the fuel cell workshop had come apart overnight. The air supply was restored and fuelling took place normally so that no buses were delayed for service. Before the workshop was locked up there was no indication that the near miss would occur. Investigation found that the connector was fitted with the correct crimp.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2020

Facility

Application
Hydrogen refuelling station
Sub-application
Hydrogen dispenser
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

H2 dispenser

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Location type
Open
Location
populated area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The refuelling station was working on only one dispenser, because the other one had been shut down for repairing a leakage.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Post-event summary

The air supply was restored and fuelling took place normally so that no buses were delayed for service.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

It has been ensured that the taps to the air lines are closed before the workshop is shutdown, removing in this way risk of a similar incident or near miss happening again. The Producer will check their nitrogen supply to ensure that it keeps the correct pressure in the system also in the event of a compressed air failure.

In-depth data

Release type
no release
Released amount (kg)
0
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
Investigation report
Reference & weblink

Provided to JRC by the operator of the facility (confidential)