Event
- Event ID
- 404
- Quality
- Description
At a refuelling station for buses, the first dispenser had been taken out of operation, because leaking (see HIAD event 403). Another dispenser was being used. Fuelling was taking too long and was very slow. The producer was called and it was found that the solenoid valves were not opening correctly due to a lack of compressed air.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- No Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- United Kingdom
- Date
- Component involved
- valve (generic)
- Failure mode
- malfunctioning
- Initiating cause
- conventional component failure (compressed air)
- Root CAUSE analysis
It was found that a snap connector on an air line in the fuel cell workshop had come apart overnight. The air supply was restored and fuelling took place normally so that no buses were delayed for service. Before the workshop was locked up there was no indication that the near miss would occur. Investigation found that the connector was fitted with the correct crimp.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2020
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen refuelling station
- Sub-application
- Hydrogen dispenser
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
H2 dispenser
- Process temperature range [C]
- ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
- Location type
- Open
- Location
- populated area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
The refuelling station was working on only one dispenser, because the other one had been shut down for repairing a leakage.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
The air supply was restored and fuelling took place normally so that no buses were delayed for service.
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
It has been ensured that the taps to the air lines are closed before the workshop is shutdown, removing in this way risk of a similar incident or near miss happening again. The Producer will check their nitrogen supply to ensure that it keeps the correct pressure in the system also in the event of a compressed air failure.
In-depth data
- Release type
- no release
- Released amount (kg)
- 0
- Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- Investigation report
- Reference & weblink
Provided to JRC by the operator of the facility (confidential)