Event
- Event ID
- 457
- Quality
- Description
During transfer of LH2 from a 200,000 gallon (760 m3) storage vessel to a road trailer, loss of vacuum was detected due to a crack in the outer vessel. The crack was located below an elbow of the 6” diameter pressurisation line. The probable cause of the crack was the formation of liquid air dripping onto the outer vessel.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- leak no ignition
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Component involved
- cryogenic insulation shell
- Failure mode
- leak, no ignition
- Initiating cause
- material degradation (thermal stress/cycling)
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the failing of outer thermal shield of the vessel, due to thermal cold shock.
During the transfer operation liquid air formed on the vertical run of the pressurisation line, ran down the pipe and then dripped of the elbow onto the vessel. The vertical run did not have drip trays to collect liquid air and the crack formed where the liquid air dropped.
Probable ROOT CAUSE was an installation error (a missing drip tray supposed to be there) or a design error (a not-foreseen safety component).- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/11/2025
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen stationary storage
- Sub-application
- LH2 storage
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
connection, LH2 vessel
- Process temperature range [C]
- cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
- Process pressure range [MPa]
- low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
- Location type
- Open
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
The report does not specify the application. It is highly probable that it was a loading of a road tanker at the hydrogen production facility.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
It is unknown if the vessel had to be vented, or mitigting actions were availale to continue the transfer without loosing the whole stored quantity.
- Emergency action
The LH2 was transferred and the inner vessel purged with hot N2 gas. also positive and vacuum pressures were applied. The annular space was brought up to atmospheric pressure and filled with N2 gas. The crack was then repaired.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The consequence of the loss of thermal insulation capacity on the cryogenic vessel are unknown. The most probable immediate effect would have been the increased boil-off and internal pressure, with the need to vent. However, it is unknown if the whole vessel content had to be vented, or mitigating actions would have allowed to repair the crack and re-install the vacuum without major content loss.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release pressure [MPa]
- <1.0
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- ORDIN
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 84 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002