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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Event

Event ID
457
Quality
Description

During transfer of LH2 from a 200,000 gallon (760 m3) storage vessel to a road trailer, loss of vacuum was detected due to a crack in the outer vessel. The crack was located below an elbow of the 6” diameter pressurisation line. The probable cause of the crack was the formation of liquid air dripping onto the outer vessel.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Component involved
cryogenic insulation shell
Failure mode
leak, no ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (thermal stress/cycling)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was the failing of outer thermal shield of the vessel, due to thermal cold shock.
During the transfer operation liquid air formed on the vertical run of the pressurisation line, ran down the pipe and then dripped of the elbow onto the vessel. The vertical run did not have drip trays to collect liquid air and the crack formed where the liquid air dropped.
Probable ROOT CAUSE was an installation error (a missing drip tray supposed to be there) or a design error (a not-foreseen safety component).

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/11/2025

Facility

Application
Hydrogen stationary storage
Sub-application
LH2 storage
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

connection, LH2 vessel

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

The report does not specify the application. It is highly probable that it was a loading of a road tanker at the hydrogen production facility.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Post-event summary

It is unknown if the vessel had to be vented, or mitigting actions were availale to continue the transfer without loosing the whole stored quantity.

Emergency action

The LH2 was transferred and the inner vessel purged with hot N2 gas. also positive and vacuum pressures were applied. The annular space was brought up to atmospheric pressure and filled with N2 gas. The crack was then repaired.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The consequence of the loss of thermal insulation capacity on the cryogenic vessel are unknown. The most probable immediate effect would have been the increased boil-off and internal pressure, with the need to vent. However, it is unknown if the whole vessel content had to be vented, or mitigating actions would have allowed to repair the crack and re-install the vacuum without major content loss.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release pressure [MPa]
<1.0
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
ORDIN
Reference & weblink

Mishap no 84 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002