Leakage at a hydrogen refilling station in a airport

This near miss occurred at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. At 7:35, a hydrogen leak was detected by hearing whistles in the near of a pipe.
The operators warned the airport firefighters ten minutes later. Upon their arrival, the firefighters set up a security perimeter of 150 m around the installation.
The station is located on the border between the public space and the private space and was surrounded by a fence with a gate accessible only by a code unknown to the emergency services. This causes the firefighters the difficulty to pass from one area to another.
Moreover, the airport fuel depot was very close and raised the fear of a possible domino effect in the event of a UVCE (unconfined vapour cloud explosion) or an explosion of the trailer. The airport activity was impacted for 30 minutes, but not air traffic. The emergency services had trouble contacting the airport operator who sent a technician only at the end of the day. The technician locks the shut-off valve of the trailer acting as hydrogen storage at 18:40.
Two days later, a technician precisely located the location of the leak and fixed it.
The operator estimated the quantity of hydrogen released at 5.7 kg.

The INITIATING cause of the leak is the failure of the joint connecting the hydrogen dispenser to the refuelling hose.
A lack of communication between operator and the emergency services hindered the placing of preventing and mitigating measures. Also the access logistic had not been designed to optimise a quick emergency action.

dispenser, flexible hose

The airport activity was impacted for 30 minutes, but not air traffic.

At 7:35 a.m. a hydrogen leak was detected
At 7:45 a.m. the operators warned the airport firefighters which set up a security perimeter of 150 m around the installation.
The airport activity is impacted for 30 minutes, but not air traffic.
The emergency services have trouble contacting the operator who sends a technician at the end of the day. This locks the trailer shut-off valve at 6:40 p.m.
Two days later, a technician precisely located the location of the leak and fixed it

GENERAL
The event reveal shortcoming in the logistics and the communications between stakeholders during the emergency.
The design of the access to the installation has to take into account the access of the emergency services.
The risk assessment during the design phase has to take into account possible domino effects resulting from the vicinity of other industrial installation. In this case possibility, the possibility of a domino effect resulting from the vicinity of airport fuel storage had been neglected.