Event
- Event ID
- 398
- Quality
- Description
Test facility H2 vent line exploded destroying about 150 feet of line. The flare stack was on at the time.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Component involved
- venting system (line)
- Failure mode
- internal explosion
- Initiating cause
- inadequate or no purge
- Root CAUSE analysis
The line had not been properly purged after removing and installing a vent valve in the system. Ignition of the hydrogen-air mixture occurred either from flare stack or from static charge.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/11/2025
Facility
- Application
- Non-road vehicles
- Sub-application
- Aerospace
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
vent
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location
- countryside or desert
- Operational condition
- UNKNOWN
- Pre-event occurrences
The vent line had been earlier maintained, by re-installation of a vent valve. It is unknown if the incident occurred during testing or shutdown venting.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
Only part of the vent line was destroyed.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Explosion type
References
- Sources categories
- ORDIN
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 58 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002
