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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Hydrogen leak at a refinery

Event

Event ID
952
Quality
Description

A gas release occurred on a pipe located between two hydrogenation units of a steam cracker. The gaseous mixture transported through this line was composed of 95% hydrogen, 4% methane and 1% nitrogen. The pipe was located in a rack within the cold sector, at a height of 6 m.

The personnel shut down the steam cracker and isolated the sector and the gases of the hydrogenation units were sent to the flare system. The leak was successfully sealed at noon, while the steam cracker remained down for a full 24 hours.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Component involved
pipe (generic)
Failure mode
rupture, no ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (external corrosion)
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIATING cause of the leak was the weakening of the pipe due to external corrosion by water drop, followed by a mechanical shock during operation.

According to ARIA, the ROOT CAUSE was the inadequate inspection and consequent failure of damage detection and repair.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2018

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Steam methane reforming
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

pipeline, steam cracker

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
medium pressure (2 to 10 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

Diameter of the pipe: 2''

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The direct cause of the pipe rupture was a water runoff due to vapour condensation on a cold pipe above the perforated piping assembly. This drop-by-drop action had weakened the pipeline by corrosion which thinned the upper part of the pipe. The perforation had resulted from a pressure shock during operation.
The authority responsible for the inspection of the classified facilities that the pipeline was lacking the paint protecting against corrosion. This pipe section had been repainted in 1990 and verified during previous inspections, in 2000 and 2007. During this last inspection, the inspectors noticed water runoff on the pipe, along with a major degradation of pipe paint, which in some cases had totally disappeared. Since an expansion layer formed by corrosion/erosion, the integrity of the section could not be assessed. No specific guideline was issued for the restoration of this section (as a minimum, the repainting of the section would have been necessary).
As consequence of the leak, the authority required the plant operator to put in place an effective plan for an effective regular inspection and actions guaranteeing the integrity of the components.

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 95%
CH4 4%
N2 1%
Release temperature [°C]
40
Release pressure [MPa]
3
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
ARIA
Reference & weblink

Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/38140/
(accessed October 2020)