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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Hydrogen fire in an industrial gas production and treatment plant

Event

Event ID
986
Quality
Description

A hydrogen leak caused a fireball in in an industrial gas processing and conditioning plant.
The leak occurred at the end of a hose in a packaging or transfer station, where tube trailers are refilled, ready to be tracked away.
The sound typical of an explosion was heard. The site's hydrogen supply was automatically cut off thanks to safety devices. Transfer was suspended while the source of the incident was determined.

The operator had just disconnected the hose used to fill a semi-trailer. He had done so to replace a check valve that was vibrating noisily during filling. The hydrogen supply was off, the automation had been switched to manual mode, and the hose had been purged and disconnected. Nevertheless, pressurised hydrogen entered the disconnected hose, causing the leak. The ARIA report explains the presence of hydrogen in the hose by the fact that the hose's anti-whip cable remained attached. This however does not make much sense, because an anti-whip cable is not a high-pressure connection and does not carry any gas.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
fire
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Component involved
hose (trailer)
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
wrong operation
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was the accidental release of hydrogen from a hose which should have been disconnected and emptied.

The explanation provided by the sources used for this event is flawed and cannot be used to extract a ROOT CAUSE, which could be only tentatively appointed to a human error.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2024

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

hydrogen trailer, connecting hose, non-return hydrogen valve

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
medium to high pressure (10 to 50 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The trailer filling had been stopped and the hose disconnected, to replace a malfunctioning check valve.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
1
Post-event summary

The operator in charge of filling was unhurt but shocked and a psychological support team was set up for.
No property damge or environmental impact.

Emergency action

The filling process was suspended until the cause of the incident was found.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Due to the lack of clarity on the causes of the leak, it is impossible to draw a specific return of experience from this event.

In general, it can be observed that the incident occurred during a ‘non-standard’ situation. An employee had to replace a malfunctioning valve. To do so, the automatic system in places during the ‘normal’ filling operations had been switched off. It is impossible to attribute the cause of the hydrogen explosion to a human error or to unclear procedures. Nevertheless, it is known that probability of a mishap increases, when operating high-pressure systems in manual mode and when executing an action not belonging to the series of actions to which employees are used to and execute every day.

Another reflection concerns the fact that the employee in charge was “…shocked, and a psychological support unit was set up for the employees.”
Despite the familiarity of employees with handling hydrogen and hydrogen systems, an unexpected event felt has life-threatening has a strong psychological impact. Moreover, hydrogen releases are characterised by very loud noises, an additional ‘ frightening’ element on top of a fire ball.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type
Fireball

References

Sources categories
ARIA
Reference & weblink

Event description no 56348 in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/56348_en/?lang=…
(accessed October 2021)