Fire in the hydrogen storage and supply system of a nuclear power plant

A hydrogen skid was placed into service in a nuclear power plant, outside the controlled area. This skid, like seven others, was located in a gas cylinder storage facility. It was supplied by several hydrogen cylinders at a pressure of 200 bar. As its pressure was rising, a manifold on the skid was blown off, causing the hydrogen to leak and ignite. The flaming jet measured 40 cm and continued as the system was open. Surprised by the incident, an employee fell and slightly injured his arm. The site’s internal emergency plan was initiated.

The storage facility was located just 20 m from a 400 kV high-voltage power line. The use of hydraulic means was therefore impossible. Firefighters were able to close the hydrogen supply valve, which stopped the leak. The two skids impacted by the fire were removed from service.

The analysis of the accident showed that the manifold was loose and that its threads were worn. Mechanical friction during the expulsion had released enough energy to ignite the hydrogen. The operator conducted electrical and mechanical inspections of all the site’s gas storage facilities. 60% of the manifolds was found with tightening defects.

INITIATING CAUSE is the failure of a loose manifold on a skid causing the hydrogen to leak and ignite.

Following the incident, an inspection found that a lack of tightening on 60% of the manifolds.
Therefore the ROOT CAUSE could be identified in a lack of a an effective procedure for the installation and inspections of the skids high pressure components.

hydrogen supply unit of a nuclear power plant

The only property damage was related to the two skids affected by the fire. In addition, some unreported loss of hydrogen occurred.
The injury was not caused by the hydrogen-related aspects of the incident. Surprised by the incident, the employee fell and slightly injured his arm.

The operator issued rapid feedback on the accident to other nuclear power plants. In this document, it described the accident and the safety measures to be taken to prevent it.

The site’s internal emergency plan was initiated.
The storage facility was located just 20 m from a 400 kV high-voltage power line. The use of hydraulic means was therefore impossible. Firefighters were able to close the hydrogen supply valve, which stopped the leak. The alert was called off at 2 a.m. The two skids impacted by the fire were removed from service.

The operator took the following corrective actions:
1. periodic inspection of the tightening of the traps and their threads;
2. review of the gas storage facility’s access conditions;
3. study of modifications to the systems for purging flammable gas skids and protection against self-ignition;
4. thoughtful analysis of the leak search procedure: study to replace the hydrogen detection system via an explosimeter with compressed air and a microbubble search.