Event
- Event ID
- 942
- Quality
- Description
The event occurred at vent stack of an ammonia synthesis unit. Gas was released from the water purge line or the hydraulic guard of the vent stack. The process gas consisting in 75% hydrogen, ignited.
The fire could be extinguished the by the emergency decompression of the unit and the automatic shutdown of the synthetic gas turbocharger.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- fire
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Component involved
- off-gas system (safeguars seal)
- Failure mode
- rupture & ignition
- Initiating cause
- over-pressurisation (wrong operation)
- Root CAUSE analysis
As reported with details the ARIA description (see references), the investigation performed by the plant operator has shown that a series of not-coordinated detection of fluid levels at the exit of the reactor caused an over-pressure in the chimney. This has displaced the liquid content of the hydraulic guard at the bottom of the chimney and some of the syngas passed through the purge line of the guard and ignited. The accidental scenario of syngas emissions from the purge line had not been formally identified by the operator, nevertheless was covered by the general provisions of the emergency plan.
The root cause can be identified in some design, such as the incorrect positioning of the 2 low level sensors installed in the separator, and the dimension of the withdrawal valve.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2018
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- Ammonia production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
vent stack, ammonia reactor
- Process temperature range [C]
- ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
- Location type
- Open
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
The material damage was negligible.
- Emergency action
The plant operator stated the emergency, the unit is de-pressurised and the plant fire brigade define a safety perimeter till the natural end of the fire.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
Although the ARIA report (see references) does not mention any lesson learnt, the very accurate and detailed findings from the post-accident investigation (see causes) suggest the following corrective actions:
1) to improved sensors location, and the way how their signals are worked out in the safety system of the plant (new HAZOP).
20 to better understand the flow dynamics also in accidental cases and adapt the design of the unit.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- ARIA
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/41517/
(accessed October 2020)