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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire on a hydrogen compressor in a refinery

Event

Event ID
254
Quality
Description

The incident occurred at a refinery unit for the desulphurisation of a light heavy oil.
This unit was equipped with three hydrogen compressors. Two of them were usually operated and the third was kept in standby. On the day of the accident, due to the malfunctioning of one of the two operating compressors, it was decided to switch to the standby compressor.
The pre-start-up inspection of this compressor did not reveal any problem. However, at the start-up, its recycling buffer burst, releasing hydrogen which caught fire.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
fire
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Component involved
CGH2 tank (stationary)
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (internal corrosion / erosion)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was a loss of confinement due to corrosion.
The buffer tank ruptured at normal operating conditions (66 barg, 66 ° C, in presence of hydrogen sulphide). This tank, which had the function of damper, had experienced a humid hydrogen sulphide gas environment for many years. The rupture occurred by stress corrosion cracking caused by the hydrogen sulphide gas.
The ROOT CAUSE was due to inadequacies in material selection, design, and maintenance inspection of the failed component.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
25/10/2024

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

H2 buffer tank (damper),
Hydrogen compressor

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
medium pressure (2 to 10 MPa)
Location type
Confined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The desulphurisation unit was equipped with 3 hydrogen recycling compressors. Two of them were usually operated and the third was kept in standby. On the day of the accident, one of the two operating compressors started malfunctioning. Therefore, it was decided to switch to the standby compressor.
The pre-start-up inspection of this compressor did not reveal any problem.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
The makeup side of the hydrogen suppy delivered 8900 std m3/h 15 bar at ambient tempearture.
At the compressor, the process gas was brought from 69 bar (64 C) to 82 bar (80 C), with a flow of ca. 52,000 std m3/h.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
2
Environmental damage
69000000
Post-event summary

Flying debris was scattered within a radius of 29 m. Total damage to the slate roof of a high-pressure gas compressor house.
Damage to the hydrogen compressor, to the steel floor gratings, and to the wall of a shed.

Emergency action

The unit was depressurised and the fire extinguished after 1h, due to hydrogen depletion.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

An improved component/system design should take into account the chemical environment when in use. The following improvements should be considered:
1. For this type of components, corrosion prevention measures are required, principally by design, by using better fit-for-purpose materials.
2. The mitigation of the effect of stress corrosion on the integrity of components could be achieved by measure preventing excessive mechanical/chemical stress transients, such as using shock absorbers.
3. The inspections should be improved, by developing effective methods to monitor ageing of components under complex boundary operative conditions. Detecting incremental damage at microstructural level is a difficult task, nevertheless critical to assess component integrity.

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2,
hydrocarbons,
H2 sulphide
Release temperature [°C]
25
Release pressure [MPa]
6.6
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
JST
Reference & weblink

JST Failure Knowledge Database:
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/include/fkd_showCase.php?id=CC0000153&text1…
(accessed December 2024)

JST Failure Knowledge Database - Google translation
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/include/fkd_showCase.php?id=CC0000153&text1…
(accessed December 2024)

Picture from the JST Failure Knowledge Database report CC0000153 (google transations)

Event no. 23174 of the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/174/
(accessed May 2026)