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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire in a desulphurisation unit of a refinery

Event

Event ID
730
Quality
Description

The event occurred at the flanges on the outlet of a desulphurisation reactor, which was working at about 300 degrees C. The flanges and bolts were cooled down by a large amount of rainwater which had got into the rain-cover around the flanges.
This caused the material to shrink and made the flanges too tight, putting too much stress on the ring gaskets which deformed and damaged.
As a result, hydrogen gas and light oil mist leaked out and ignited spontaneously, causing damage to pressure gauges and insulation of pipes.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
fire
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Component involved
valve (gasket)
Failure mode
leak & ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (thermal stress/cycling)
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIATING cause was a too high thermo-mechanical stress on flange of a reactor, due thermal gradient induced by rain water.

Possible ROOT CAUSES could be an inadequate risk assessment or safety design, and inadequate operative processes, which failed to protect the installation from rain.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2020

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

hydro-desulphurization unit, flanges and gaskets

Process temperature range [C]
High temperature (100°C to 500°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The operative condition were as usual, but there was a heavy rain several hours before the accident, and a large quantity of rainwater flowed in between the rain cover and the heat-insulating sheet metal.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
Yen
Property loss (onsite)
100.000
Post-event summary

A pressure gage and piping heat insulation were damaged by fire.

Emergency action

The fire was extinguished by company's own fire fighters.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

There are many cases where insufficient attention is paid to the specific locations of each valve, and its possible lifetime damage patterns. It is only after that an incident took place, that plant management realises the inadequacy of installations.

Corrective Measures

1. Measures to prevent rainwater from flowing around the flange shall be taken.
2. Similar parts of the plant shall be checked as well, and countermeasures should be taken.
3. The procedure of flange tightening force shall be reviewed.

In-depth data

Release type
aerosol
Involved substances (% vol)
H2,
light oil
Release temperature [°C]
300
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
JST
Reference & weblink

Originally in RISCAD. Now in the JST Knowledge Failure Database:
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1200030.html
(accessed Dec 2023)