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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire on a compressor at a hydro-tretement unit

Event

Event ID
110
Quality
Description

A fire developed at a recycle gas compressor of a refinery. During recommissioning, the compressor, belonging to a hydro-treatement unit, was overpressurised. The cylinder head was blown off, resulting in an explosive decompression and fire. It was found that the discharge valve was installed in the wrong direction.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
compressor / booster / pump
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
over-pressurisation (wrong operation)
Root CAUSE analysis

Investigations into the accident showed that the INITIATING CAUSE was the installation of one of the discharge valves in the reverse direction. This results in the build up of pressure within the cylinder.

The criticality of the task to replace the valve had not been understood or reflected in procedures. Although the compressor was purchased according to the API 618 standard, which requires a design that prevent valves from being installed in the wrong direction, the equipment did not meet specification.
The ROOT CAUSES were shortcoming in maintenance procedure and in quality assurance when dealing with contractors/manufacturers.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
28/02/2009

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
hydro-refiner
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

valve, compressor head, compressor,

Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

The ICHEME report used the term Hydrofiner: this is an industrial unit, primarily in oil refineries, that uses hydrogen and catalysts to remove impurities (sulphur, nitrogen, aromatics) from petroleum fractions, improving fuel quality (like gasoline, diesel, jet fuels). The more generic term is catalytic hydrotreating process to "clean" oil products, making them cleaner burning and more valuable.
The report does not specify the composition of the process gas, but it is known the the recycled gas consists mainly of hydrogen with traces of H2S.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
7
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
900.000
Post-event summary

Production losses and repair costs were estimated at $500,000 (1995) (£318,300) and $400,000 (£254,600) (1995), respectively.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The lesson learnt from this event was that the company had to review and improve the quality control and assurance of the products obtained from third parties. This review must consider all components playing a critical role in guaranteeing safety of the plant.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ICHEME
Reference & weblink

Event nr 8373 of the UK database ICHEME in PDF format
https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/
(accessed October 2020)