Event
- Event ID
- 495
- Quality
- Description
A nuclear power lant experienced a generator hydrogen fire.
The event started with a short circuit inside the main transformer, which damaged the hydrogen coolant system of the generator, followed by multiple hydrogen fires in the turbine hall.
The steam supply system of the reactor detected the failure of the transformer and was separated from the turbine-generator unit. The reactor was successfully shut down. There was no radiation emission.The damage was limited to the plant's main transformer, electrical conductors and wires leading from the generator to the transformer.
The fire was extinguished by onsite personnel.
The outage lasted one month.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- fire
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Component involved
- H2 coolant system
- Failure mode
- rupture & ignition
- Initiating cause
- conventional component failure (electricity, power)
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was an electrical failure of the main transformer, responsible for the supply of the electrical power generated in the reactor to the electrical national grid.
The power plant operator stated that "... there is no way of guaranteeing that transformer will not fail". The ROOT CAUSE can then by identified as unspecified material failure.- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2017
Facility
- Application
- Power plant
- Sub-application
- Nuclear power plant - PWR
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
Main generator
- Process temperature range [C]
- Above ambient temperature (50°C to 100°C)
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
Damage was limited to the transformer itself and to a part of the hyrogen supply system.
- Emergency action
The reactor was successfully isolated from the power generation unit and shut down.
According to a NRC note, fighting of the emergency put a strain on the resource available.
Although a senior reactor operator and auxiliary operators from another shift were available immediately, the need to provide personnel for the fire brigade and at the same time to perform the many actions required by the event caused a heavy workload for the control room staff.
This workload contributed to the licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel as specified in the licensee's procedure.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The US.NRC issued a note to alert addressees to problems that could result from inadequate controls to ensure that shift staffing is sufficient to accomplish all necessary functions required by an event. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
- Corrective Measures
In this plant, the breaker was installed between the transformer and the offsite electrical grid. The transformer was placed outside the turbine-generator hall and is separated from it by a hall wall.
The operator investigated how to further minimise the effects of transformer failures.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- NRC
- Reference & weblink
US NRC document ML20073N464
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2007/ML20073N464.pdf
(accessed January 2026)US NRC document ML20083D289
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2008/ML20083D289.pdf
(accessed January 2026)US.NRC Information Notice No. 91-77: Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants
available at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/19…