Skip to main content
Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Failure of a hydrogen pipeline

Event

Event ID
191
Quality
Description

A steel hydrogen pipeline failed with a circumferential rupture, at a location where a leak had been already detected and repaired.
The leak was discovered during a one-call response for planned third party excavation one month before. At that time, the leak was isolated, a section of pipe removed and replaced with new pipe. Following the repair, the entire pipeline was successfully hydrostatically tested, cleaned and dried. The line was returned to service three week later (November 23).
Third party excavation around the pipeline commenced December 2, 2002. The excavation terminated December 3. Two hours after the line had been backfilling, the pipe failure occurred.

A plausible explanation, confirmed by metallurgical examination, is that the failure initiated in the heat-affected zone of a butt weld on the original pipe material that had become hardened and susceptible to sudden stress relief failure. The material failed due to the application of heat, because it hardened and made the high strength steel brittleness.
[Note of the event validator: the PHMSA report does not mention the role, which the excavation works may had in building stress in the materials and in initiating cracks. It is clear nevertheless that both this and the re-pressurisation actions may have brought the stress above the limit of the welded materials, which had been compromised by the repair and welding works one month before.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
pipeline (weld)
Failure mode
rupture, no ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (over-stress)
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIATING CAUSE was the failure of a welding under sudden stresses.
The ROOT CAUSE was the repair work consisting in a weld which had changed the mechanical characteristics (hardening) of the original pipe high strength steel. This may be related to a mistake on the execution of the welding and/or in shortcoming in the operative procedure guidelines.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2021

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
pipeline
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

weld, pipe

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Location type
Underground
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The pipeline was at 1 meter depth
It had been backfilled and re-pressurised two hours before.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

DESCRIPTION OF THE PIPELINE
Diameter = A 2 1/2 inch pipeline (0.0635 m),
Wall thickness = 5 mm
Maximal allowed operative pressure = 2160 psig (148 bar)
Pipeline was installed in 1962

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
4.200
Post-event summary

The entire segment of pipeline in which the failure occurred was removed from service and abandoned, replaced with a new pipeline.

Emergency action

No evacuation.
Isolation of the pipeline segment and its de-pressurisation.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Release pressure [MPa]
14.8
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
PHMSA
Reference & weblink

US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA:
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/distribution-tra…
(accessed September 2024)