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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in a waste water tank

Event

Event ID
69
Quality
Description

This incident occurred at a waste water tank of an unspecified chemical plant. An explosive atmosphere formed inside the wastewater tank due to the accidental production of hydrogen. This occurred either during wastewater treatment or due to the reaction of excess sodium borohydride from the remaining wastewater in the tank with additional wastewater added to the tank later.
The hydrogen-air explosive atmosphere was forced through an overflow pipe and through a water seal and released into the surrounding area, where it was ignited by manual work. Subsequently, a flashback occurred through the overflow pipe into the wastewater tank, resulting in an explosion which destroyed the tank.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Germany
Date
Component involved
chemical storage tank (waste)
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
accidental hydrogen formation
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was an accidental formation of hydrogen by a chemical reaction.
The ROOT CAUSE was the lack of effective monitoring and control of the process values, specifically the lack of pH adjustment during filling of the wastewater tank. This hint at shortcoming of the operative procedures, of risk assessment and/or of proper training of operators.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
28/02/2009

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
waste management
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

water seal,
oveflow pipe, sodium borohydride tank

Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
13
Currency
Euro
Property loss (onsite)
1.000.000
Post-event summary

The tank and othe plant componets were destroyed by the explosion and subsequent fire.

Emergency action

The alarm was triggered manually by a push-button.
The area was evacuated, and the combustion products were suppressed by the fire department with a water spray.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

As preventive measure, the wastewater treatment process was modified.
As control measures, (i) a HAZOP analysis of wastewater treatment was implemented and wastewater flows were monitored.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ZEMA
Reference & weblink

Event from German database ZEMA
https://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/de/site/2854/zema/index/3223.html
(accessed December 2024)