Event
- Event ID
- 431
- Quality
- Description
During general repair and equipment replacement on a liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen Saturn test facility, a section of the 24-inch GH2 vent line ruptured. An explosion occurred causing extensive damage. The hydrogen vent system from the stage included the vent valve (being removed) which was connected through two flexible lines to the facility vent system. The facility system included a 20-inch vacuum jacketed line from the stage which connected to the 24-inch line leading to a catch tank. From the catch tank, a 36-inch line led to the flare stack. The LH2 tank was pressurized to about 4 psig with helium.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Component involved
- venting system (line)
- Failure mode
- internal explosion
- Initiating cause
- inadequate or no purge
- Root CAUSE analysis
Most probable cause of explosion was a mixture of hydrogen-air at a particular location in the duct. Hydrogen accumulated in the system due to a number of pressurisation and venting cycles with insufficient purging or from leakage of gaseous hydrogen system on stand (2500 psig, 170 bar). The vent system was not purged with high velocity gas and the periodic incremental purge with helium would not necessarily have removed the hydrogen. Air could have entered the system when the stage vent valve was removed and from an open valve at the base of the catch tank.
Ignition was most likely caused by the flare stack. The combustible mixture was considered to have reached the flare stack and ignited. The flame propagated through the catch tank into the 24-inch diameter vent line and upstream until a mixture and pressure were attained which resulted in a detonation.- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/11/2025
Facility
- Application
- Non-road vehicles
- Sub-application
- Aerospace
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
vent, flare
- Process temperature range [C]
- cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
- Location type
- Confined
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
The stage tanks were empty of fuels and filled with helium for the repair works
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Emergency action
none
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Explosion type
References
- Sources categories
- ORDIN
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 71 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002