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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion at a vent stack

Event

Event ID
318
Quality
Description

The incident occurred at end of a hydrogen fuel pump test, when large volume of gaseous hydrogen was vented off. An explosion occurred at or near the top of the vent stack, with damage to stack segment, vent systems, ducting, and valves. The top section of vent stack was missing (it consisted in a covering "hat" section,15 ft. length, on top of the vent stack and was housing a double reversing turning vane assembly).

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Component involved
venting system
Failure mode
ignition of vented H2
Initiating cause
inadequate or wrong design
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation and ignition of an explosive air-hydrogen mixture at the end of the venting stack, where a new ''hat" section of the vent stack had been installed. Failures of internal structures had been observed prior to this incident. Therefore, the vent system had a slightly higher than normal catch tank pressures due to partial restriction of the vent stack outlet. Ignition was by static electricity or burning gas in vicinity of stack outlet.

The ROOT CAUSE could be identified in an inadequate design (and possibly manufacturing) of the stack ‘hat’.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
30/10/2025

Facility

Application
Non-road vehicles
Sub-application
Aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

LH2 pump, vent stack

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
countryside or desert
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Post-event summary

Losses probably limited to the vent end.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

This and similar events occurred when knowledge of hydrogen fluid-dynamic and ignition behaviour was still in its infancy. The NASA was learning-by-doing from these mishaps, which were causing only some property damage.

In the specific case of this event, it could be further considered if the vent ‘hat’ caused an overpressure due to some failed internal element, or just because of its geometry, forcing the vented hydrogen to reverse the flow direction. We do not know, unfortunately, the reason for the need to change the direction of the venting. It could have been the need to ensure better protections for neighbouring components.

In-depth data

Release type
liquid
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ORDIN
Reference & weblink

Mishap no 30 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002