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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

explosion on a testing unit of rockets

Event

Event ID
460
Quality
Description

While preparations were being made for a LH2 turbopump test, an explosion occurred above the test cell. Major damage was caused throughout the test facility. A short duration fire caused minor damage.

At the time of explosion, a check was being made of the run and catch tank valves. The run tank valve was opened allowing LH2 to enter the run header. The run and return headers were at ambient temperature and the vent valves were closed. LH2 was also being transferred to the gas generator tank which required pressurisation of the LH2 run tank. Based on the estimated damage, with blast pressures of 2-3 psig, 10 pounds TNT equivalent was deto¬nated initially and followed by a second detonation equivalent to about 20 pounds TNT.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Component involved
joint/connection (expansion joint)
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
over-pressurisation (flash evaporation)
Root CAUSE analysis

The explosion was due to over-pressurisation of the bellows assembly in suction duct , followed by activation of a burst disk and subsequent release of about 60 pounds of hydrogen.
The IGNITION SOURCE was probably a static charge produced by torn edges of burst disk. Forcing the liquid hydrogen from the run tank into the warm header caused flashing of the liquid and buildup of high pressures sufficient to rupture bellows. The relief valves were not large enough to handle the gases evolved.
The bellows failure produced two separate clouds of hydrogen gas joined by a flammable cloud zone which allowed common ignition. A large amount of H2 was considered in the second cloud as being released from the run header.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/11/2025

Facility

Application
Non-road vehicles
Sub-application
Aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

bellow, burst disks, valves and header

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Location type
Semiconfined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount (kg)
27
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ORDIN
Reference & weblink

Mishap no 95 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002