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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

An explosion in an electrolyser for the production of chlorine

Event

Event ID
104
Quality
Description

An explosion occurred in a electrolyser cell, blowing off the cell's vent cover and severing a low-pressure chlorine gas pipeline., what caused a release of chlorine in the building,

The event occurred when two operators were trying to improve the tightness of the diaphragm. They were only very lightly injured.

A reaction between hydrogen and chlorine in the cell's headspace was responsible for the explosion. The migration of hydrogen towards the chlorine, producing an explosive mix, was due to excessive pressure in the cathodic compartment.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Component involved
electrolytic cell (diaphragm)
Failure mode
internal explosion
Initiating cause
malfunctioning (electrolyser, cross-over)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was the diffusion of hydrogen into the chlorine half-cell, creating an explosive mixture.

The post-incident analysis revealed a poor quality of the cell's diaphragm: it was part of a batch of diaphragms whose manufacture did not adhere to standard procedures (crosslinking temperature of 275°C instead of 355°C due to a furnace regulation failure) and which subsequently exhibited premature aging.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
28/02/2009

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

diaphragm, vent, piping

Process temperature range [C]
Above ambient temperature (50°C to 100°C)
Location type
Confined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

During routine controls a malfunction was observed at the level of the diaphragm..
The accident occurred when proceeding to a cell ‘vaccination’ procedure, consisting in improving the seal of the orifice plate (diaphragm) separating chlorine and hydrogen. This is achieved by injecting suspended silica and magnesium chloride or glass fibres

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
2
Post-event summary

Two workers were very lightly injured, both having experienced a shock fro mthe explosion and having skin irritations in the legs caused by the acidic electrolyte (pH=3).
The chlorine discharged inside the workshop amounted to between 2 and 3 kg.
The series of 132 electrolytic cells in the shop were shut down, followed by the entire production chain.

Emergency action

The production unit was stopped

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

On top of the defective diaphragm, the increase hydrogen pressure and its migration can be the result of three situations: an incorrect positioning of the caustic soda tube, leading to an excessively high caustic soda level in the cell; a blockage of the caustic soda outlet pipe; or blockage of the H2 outlet pipe.
Therefore, the corrective measures put in place by the operator included
(1) Replacing cells whose diaphragms were produced under the same temperature conditions.
(2) Clarifying the intervention instructions related to the 'vaccination' of the cells,
(3) Modifying the hydrogen outlet pipes to facilitate checks and cleaning and thus limit the risk of blockage.

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
Cl2
H2
Released amount (kg)
3
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ARIA
Reference & weblink

Event no. 30637 of the French database ARIA (accessed December 2020)