Event
- Event ID
- 104
- Quality
- Description
An explosion occurred in a electrolyser cell, blowing off the cell's vent cover and severing a low-pressure chlorine gas pipeline., what caused a release of chlorine in the building,
The event occurred when two operators were trying to improve the tightness of the diaphragm. They were only very lightly injured.
A reaction between hydrogen and chlorine in the cell's headspace was responsible for the explosion. The migration of hydrogen towards the chlorine, producing an explosive mix, was due to excessive pressure in the cathodic compartment.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Component involved
- electrolytic cell (diaphragm)
- Failure mode
- internal explosion
- Initiating cause
- malfunctioning (electrolyser, cross-over)
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the diffusion of hydrogen into the chlorine half-cell, creating an explosive mixture.
The post-incident analysis revealed a poor quality of the cell's diaphragm: it was part of a batch of diaphragms whose manufacture did not adhere to standard procedures (crosslinking temperature of 275°C instead of 355°C due to a furnace regulation failure) and which subsequently exhibited premature aging.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 28/02/2009
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- Chlorine production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
diaphragm, vent, piping
- Process temperature range [C]
- Above ambient temperature (50°C to 100°C)
- Location type
- Confined
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
During routine controls a malfunction was observed at the level of the diaphragm..
The accident occurred when proceeding to a cell ‘vaccination’ procedure, consisting in improving the seal of the orifice plate (diaphragm) separating chlorine and hydrogen. This is achieved by injecting suspended silica and magnesium chloride or glass fibres
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 2
- Post-event summary
Two workers were very lightly injured, both having experienced a shock fro mthe explosion and having skin irritations in the legs caused by the acidic electrolyte (pH=3).
The chlorine discharged inside the workshop amounted to between 2 and 3 kg.
The series of 132 electrolytic cells in the shop were shut down, followed by the entire production chain.- Emergency action
The production unit was stopped
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
On top of the defective diaphragm, the increase hydrogen pressure and its migration can be the result of three situations: an incorrect positioning of the caustic soda tube, leading to an excessively high caustic soda level in the cell; a blockage of the caustic soda outlet pipe; or blockage of the H2 outlet pipe.
Therefore, the corrective measures put in place by the operator included
(1) Replacing cells whose diaphragms were produced under the same temperature conditions.
(2) Clarifying the intervention instructions related to the 'vaccination' of the cells,
(3) Modifying the hydrogen outlet pipes to facilitate checks and cleaning and thus limit the risk of blockage.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- Cl2
H2 - Released amount (kg)
- 3
- Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Explosion type
References
- Sources categories
- ARIA
- Reference & weblink
Event no. 30637 of the French database ARIA (accessed December 2020)