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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion and fire in chemicals production plant

Event

Event ID
234
Quality
Description

The accident occurred in the organo-metallic compound production unit, on a transport container for aluminium alkyls, which exploded during a cleansing process at the washing station. The incident was caused by a pressure build-up inside the container caused by flammable gases, mainly hydrogen, formed by the chemical reaction of aqueous caustic soda solution with the aluminium alkyl residues.

This cleansing of the transport containers is a standard procedure after return from customers and before a new filling. However, in this particular case, even after several attempts it was impossible to completely remove the deposits on the inner wall of the container. Tests aiming at the detection of reactive alkyl residues showed negative results. Thus, the deposits were exposed to an aqueous solution of caustic soda (NaOH). Since no production of heat or gases had been detected over a period of several hours, to increase the effectiveness of the cleaning procedure the container was sealed (against the instruction) and kept revolving around its longitudinal axis on a roller system.
After a short time of this process, the container burst, torn apart along the longitudinal axis, while part of is bottom was blown away and damaged a heptane pipeline. The released heptane ignited, and the whole building caught fire.
The container had been sealed infringing operating instructions.
The substances involved were aluminium, aluminium alkyls, heptane (H₃C₅CH₃), sodium hydroxide (NaOH), hydrogen.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Germany
Date
Component involved
chemical storage tank
Failure mode
internal explosion
Initiating cause
run-away reaction
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING cause was the pressure build-up inside the container by formation of flammable gases, mainly hydrogen.
The container had been tested for reactive material, as prescribed by the procedure.
However, the container had been sealed, against what prescribed by operating instructions. This could be the ROOT CAUSE, suggesting a lack of technology/operative knowledge of the employees.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2018

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
organo-metallic compound production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

chemicals transport container, heptane pipeline

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The event occurred after various failed attempts to perform the cleaning process according to instruction.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

ALUMINIUM ALKYS
Aluminium alkyls are organoaluminium compounds generally represented by the formula
AlR3 (or dimers Al2R6), where R is an alkyl group like methyl (-CH3) or ethyl (-CH5).

The most common is the trimethylaluminium (TMA) and the triethylaluminium (TEA).

TMA has the formula Al2(CH3)6 (abbreviated as Al2Me6, where Me stands for methyl). It is an industrially important compound, used as a catalyst or in semiconductors processing.
It is a colourless liquid, pyrophoric and highly reactive, air- and moisture sensitive. It must be strictly handled in inert gas atmosphere. It can decompose spontaneously in air to give aluminum oxide in a very exothermic reaction. To eliminate the residues contained in the tank, a reaction with NaOH was performed, which is exothermic and produce aluminium oxide and methane.

TEA (Al2Et6 or Al2(C2H5)6 ) is used as reagent in organic chemistry and as pyrophoric agent. In contact with water ir produces H2 and CH4 in approximated ratio 1 to 2.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
1
Number of injured persons
1
Currency
Euro
Property loss (onsite)
1.800.000
Post-event summary

According to ARIA report, the injured persons were two.
According to ZEMA , only 1.
The material damage were assessed around 3,6 M de DM

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

This is an accident where hydrogen was produced accidentally, by reaction of chemical product; therefore, in general, measures aiming at avoiding recurrence of the same type of accidents should concentrate in preventing formation of explosive atmospheres. These could be based on a ventilation purge strategy, and/or on the choice of less reactive cleansing substances allowing for a slower, thus better controllable reaction dynamics.

Corrective Measures

According to the sources (see References), the following measures were recommended:
(1) Cleaning operations of the containers to be performed with a washing medium not reacting with deposits in the containers;
(2) To provide the washing station with weighing systems, allowing a determination of residue quantities after washing by weighing the container before and after the cleaning process;
(3) To review of the operating instructions.
(4) To performing safety training activities.
(5) To develop accident scenarios and modelling their consequences;
(6) To review the emergency plans.

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2,
C7H16
Release temperature [°C]
20
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
eMARS
Reference & weblink

Event description in the European database eMARS
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/eMARS/accident/view/61423583-fd94-5ba…
(accessed December 2020)

Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/19461/
(accessed December 2020)

Event from German database ZEMA
https://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/de/site/2854/zema/index/3065.html
(accessed December 2024)