Event
- Event ID
- 935
- Quality
- Description
An explosion happened at a chlorine production plant (Seveso-classified)
The plant had been shut down for two weeks, and maintenance works were ongoing. Two subcontractor employees were cutting a purge pipe on a hydrogen manifold in the chlorine electrolysis room while a plant worker was purging the brine circuit (brine is used as a raw material in chlorine production).
A through-cut of the pipe caused an explosion inside the hydrogen manifold that blew apart the rubber sleeves connecting the manifold to the electrolysis cells. Reason of the explosion was ignition during the cutting operation of an air-hydrogen mixture. The air was present because of the electrolysis cells were opened. The presence of hydrogen was probably due to insufficient nitrogen purging and/or several weeks of hydrogen desorption from the steel of the manifold.The facility was placed in a safe condition and the fire-fighters were alerted.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Component involved
- pipe (generic)
- Failure mode
- rupture & ignition
- Initiating cause
- wrong operation
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was cutting a hydrogen-containing pipe, followed by its ignition due to sparks from the cutting tools.
According to the ARIA report, the work authorisation issued to the subcontractor had not identified the risk of hydrogen in the manifold, which had been purged with nitrogen when the electrolysis room was shut down in December. On top of that, the work authorisation did not call for closing the valve which isolated the manifold from the hydrogen condensate pipe. This was due to a misunderstanding about the exact location of the cut.
Contributing to a ROOT CAUSE were (i) an inadequate purging of the hydrogen system and (ii) the inadequate risk assessment underlying an ill-written working permit for the subcontractors.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2018
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- Chlorine production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
hydrogen manifold, electrolyser cells
- Process temperature range [C]
- ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
Maintenance work were ongoing.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 1
- Post-event summary
The operator was knocked down by the explosion and sustained injuries from flying pieces of sleeve and plastic, brought to the hospital and released the same evening. The two subcontractor employees, shaken by the blast, were treated in the site’s infirmary.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
According to the ARIA report (see reference), the lesson learnt by the plant operator was the implementation of regular audits of the risk assessments conducted when work authorisations are issued.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Explosion type
References
- Sources categories
- ARIA
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/43286/
(accessed September 2020)