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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

H2 explosion at a chlorine production plant

Event

Event ID
935
Quality
Description

An explosion happened at a chlorine production plant (Seveso-classified)
The plant had been shut down for two weeks, and maintenance works were ongoing. Two subcontractor employees were cutting a purge pipe on a hydrogen manifold in the chlorine electrolysis room while a plant worker was purging the brine circuit (brine is used as a raw material in chlorine production).
A through-cut of the pipe caused an explosion inside the hydrogen manifold that blew apart the rubber sleeves connecting the manifold to the electrolysis cells. Reason of the explosion was ignition during the cutting operation of an air-hydrogen mixture. The air was present because of the electrolysis cells were opened. The presence of hydrogen was probably due to insufficient nitrogen purging and/or several weeks of hydrogen desorption from the steel of the manifold.

The facility was placed in a safe condition and the fire-fighters were alerted.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Component involved
pipe (generic)
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
wrong operation
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was cutting a hydrogen-containing pipe, followed by its ignition due to sparks from the cutting tools.

According to the ARIA report, the work authorisation issued to the subcontractor had not identified the risk of hydrogen in the manifold, which had been purged with nitrogen when the electrolysis room was shut down in December. On top of that, the work authorisation did not call for closing the valve which isolated the manifold from the hydrogen condensate pipe. This was due to a misunderstanding about the exact location of the cut.

Contributing to a ROOT CAUSE were (i) an inadequate purging of the hydrogen system and (ii) the inadequate risk assessment underlying an ill-written working permit for the subcontractors.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2018

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

hydrogen manifold, electrolyser cells

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

Maintenance work were ongoing.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
1
Post-event summary

The operator was knocked down by the explosion and sustained injuries from flying pieces of sleeve and plastic, brought to the hospital and released the same evening. The two subcontractor employees, shaken by the blast, were treated in the site’s infirmary.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

According to the ARIA report (see reference), the lesson learnt by the plant operator was the implementation of regular audits of the risk assessments conducted when work authorisations are issued.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ARIA
Reference & weblink

Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/43286/
(accessed September 2020)