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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire in a process reactor of a metallurgical plant

Event

Event ID
925
Quality
Description

The event occurred in a classified-Seveso metallurgical plant. A fire initiated in a acid treatment reactor of a workshop handling cementation of indium .
Under normal conditions, the reaction of the process in the tank releases hydrogen.
The fire propagated to the plastic components above the tank, causing black smoke released inside the workshop.

The origin of the fire were sparks produced by the grinding of metal gratings overhanging the tank. According to the ARIA report (see references), they must have come into contact with the gaseous atmosphere of the tank through the throughput of the stirring shaft.
The grinding work had been allowed by an intervention permit and was equipped with protections designed to limit the dispersion of sparks.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
fire
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Component involved
reactor / oven / furnace / test chamber
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
inadequate or wrong design
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIATING CAUSE were the sparks generated by grinding, supposed to enter the tank containing hydrogen as reaction product.

The ROOT CAUSE is not reported. Nevertheless, considering that the grinding works were designed to preventing hydrogen ignition, the root cause could be attributed to shortcoming i design of the reactor and of risk-preventing measures.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2018

Facility

Application
Steel and metals industry
Sub-application
Indium production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

acid metallurgical treatment reactor

Location type
Confined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

Maintenance works were executed on top of the reactor tank

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Official legal action

The inspection of Seveso-classified installations required a detailed inspection of the tank in question and the systematic implementation of thermal camera control of hot spots following a fire

Emergency action

The second responders extinguished the fire after 15 minutes using foamers and cooled the installations. The fire resumed after a few minutes, as some undetected hot spots had remained. The further use of foamers allowed its final extinguishment.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The fact that the inspection required for the future the systematic implementation of thermal camera during firefighting is due to the fact that during the emergency actions, the fire regained strength due to undetected hot spots.

The ARIA report (see references) does not report any lesson learnt. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably assumed that the event would profit from improved maintenance procedure, such as purging of the tank and monitoring hydrogen concentrations in the gaseous phase of tank.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
ARIA
Reference & weblink

Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/46155/
(accessed September 2020)