Event
- Event ID
- 925
- Quality
- Description
The event occurred in a classified-Seveso metallurgical plant. A fire initiated in a acid treatment reactor of a workshop handling cementation of indium .
Under normal conditions, the reaction of the process in the tank releases hydrogen.
The fire propagated to the plastic components above the tank, causing black smoke released inside the workshop.The origin of the fire were sparks produced by the grinding of metal gratings overhanging the tank. According to the ARIA report (see references), they must have come into contact with the gaseous atmosphere of the tank through the throughput of the stirring shaft.
The grinding work had been allowed by an intervention permit and was equipped with protections designed to limit the dispersion of sparks.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- fire
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Component involved
- reactor / oven / furnace / test chamber
- Failure mode
- rupture & ignition
- Initiating cause
- inadequate or wrong design
- Root CAUSE analysis
INITIATING CAUSE were the sparks generated by grinding, supposed to enter the tank containing hydrogen as reaction product.
The ROOT CAUSE is not reported. Nevertheless, considering that the grinding works were designed to preventing hydrogen ignition, the root cause could be attributed to shortcoming i design of the reactor and of risk-preventing measures.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2018
Facility
- Application
- Steel and metals industry
- Sub-application
- Indium production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
acid metallurgical treatment reactor
- Location type
- Confined
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
Maintenance works were executed on top of the reactor tank
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Official legal action
The inspection of Seveso-classified installations required a detailed inspection of the tank in question and the systematic implementation of thermal camera control of hot spots following a fire
- Emergency action
The second responders extinguished the fire after 15 minutes using foamers and cooled the installations. The fire resumed after a few minutes, as some undetected hot spots had remained. The further use of foamers allowed its final extinguishment.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The fact that the inspection required for the future the systematic implementation of thermal camera during firefighting is due to the fact that during the emergency actions, the fire regained strength due to undetected hot spots.
The ARIA report (see references) does not report any lesson learnt. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably assumed that the event would profit from improved maintenance procedure, such as purging of the tank and monitoring hydrogen concentrations in the gaseous phase of tank.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- ARIA
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/46155/
(accessed September 2020)