Event
- Event ID
- 905
- Quality
- Description
The fire occurred after a hydrogen released from a venting valve opened for inspection. The hydrogen was at 300 bar and 300C centigrade and between 200 and 300 bar. The hydrogen ignited probably spontaneously and killed 4 workers and injured additional 3.
A similar accident seems to have taken place in the same installation 5 years before. A safety study of the facility has been requested before the start-up of the plant- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- fire
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Component involved
- valve (vent)
- Failure mode
- rupture & ignition
- Initiating cause
- wrong operation
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause was the manual opening of a valve which released hydrogen
The root causes have not been identified even if a general test of the equipment involved in the fire and/or suspected to have caused the accident was carried out.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2018
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- alcohols production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
venting flange reactor(?)
- Process temperature range [C]
- High temperature (100°C to 500°C)
- Process pressure range [MPa]
- medium to high pressure (10 to 50 MPa)
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
The hydrogenation unit was part of an organic chemical industry for the production of raw hydrogenated alcohols from vegetable and animal raw materials.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 4
- Number of injured persons
- 3
- Currency
- Euro
- Property loss (onsite)
- 2.500.000
- Post-event summary
4 causalities, 3 injured workers, 2.5 MEuro damage.
- Emergency action
The isolation valves were shut-off and the Internal Emergency Plan was activated.
No emergency measures were required, neither on-site nor off-site.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
An investigation was performed, which however it is not (anymore) publicly available.
Logic recommendations would be to improve the venting system to avoid mass release and fire, and to conduct a detailed analysis of previous similar event which seems to have taken place in the same installation 5 years previously (in 1984).
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release pressure [MPa]
- 30
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Flame type
References
- Sources categories
- eMARS
- Reference & weblink
Event description in European database eMARS
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/eMARS/accident/view/16d71de8-dd2d-843…
(accessed September 2020)Event description in French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/170/
(accessed September 2020)