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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion at a chemical plant after recommissioning of equipment

Event

Event ID
860
Quality
Description

[Note of the event validator: according to the sources, hydrogen as combustible gas does not seems to have plaid part in this incident. However, it is more plausible that hydrogen, as the main component of the gas mixture, took part in the overall explosion, especially considering that the source speaks of the possible formation of large quantity of solid oxygen at -192 C. ]
The explosion and fire occurred at a chemical plant. The specific process affected was the separation of carbon monoxide and methane from the gas generated by partial combustion of the crude oil. This gas had as main component hydrogen. Gaseous species separation was based on liquefaction.
To fight the fire, a nitrogen purge of the combustible gas in the reactor was attempted. However, a more intense explosion occurred after two hours. During this second explosion 11 persons were killed, 44 persons got injured.
According to the source, the first explosion is believed to be caused by a nitrogen-based reaction which generated aliphatic nitro- and nitroso-compounds that are unstable and explosive. They are supposed to have accumulated and to have exploded. The cause of the second explosion is supposed to be related to (i) the fact that the insulator materials was combustibles (wool chips), and (ii) to the possibility of oxygen accumulation by extraction from air at -192 C (liquefaction temperature of CO).

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Component involved
heat exchanger (cold box)
Failure mode
rupture & ignition
Initiating cause
inadequate or wrong design
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of an explosive atmosphere in the separator unit.
A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE was the use of combustible insulation materials in contact with combustible gases.
The ROOT CAUSE relates to the insufficient risk assessment analysis of the process. However, these factors might have been unpredictable in the technological level at that time.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
02/10/2024

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
Ammonia production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

liquefaction/separation unit

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
industrial area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
11
Number of injured persons
40
Currency
yen
Property loss (onsite)
240.000.000
Post-event summary

The separator was destroyed. ¥ 240 million costs.

Emergency action

Purge and fire extinguishing work of combustible gas were carried out. However, the first purge by nitrogen may have worsened the situation and brought to the second explosion.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

1. Cold insulators for very low temperature equipment should be made of incombustible materials such as perlite.
2. The impurities contained in the process materials have to be taken into account , because they are not chemically inert and may play a role in unexpected and unwanted reactions.

In-depth data

Release type
Gas-liquid-solid mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2,
N2,
O2
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
JST
Reference & weblink

JST failures database:
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000095.html
(accessed Dec 2023)

Process shcmea picture from JST failures database:
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000095.html
(accessed Dec 2023)

Originally in Japanese dataabse RISCAD, not closed