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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Over-pressure damage to a storage tank in a refinery

Event

Event ID
700
Quality
Description

The incident occurred during a temporary shutdown of the distillate hydro-treatment unit.
It units main column overhead product was pumped to a gasoline storage tank via the straight run gasoline rundown line. When restarting the distillate hydro-treatment unit, hydrogen at a pressure of 30 bars was allowed to enter the gasoline tank, causing an overpressure and substantial damage. The tank shell was lifted upwards by approximately 110 mm.

No one was injured in the incident and there was no leakage of liquid product.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Component involved
chemical storage tank (hydrocarbon)
Failure mode
internal explosion
Initiating cause
wrong operation
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was an operation error, a wrong sequence of opening and closing of valves.
In this hydro-treatment unit, a valve in the start-up line to the high-pressure separator was branching off the line bringing the gasoline product from the crude oil distillation unit to the gasoline tank.
The high-pressure start-up line, carrying hydrogen at 30 bar, was opened before closing the line-to-tank valve.
The ICHEME report does not mention the ROOT CAUSE, but the operation error seems to hint at inadequate operative instruction and risk assessment.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2021

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

Distillation tank, hydro-treater

Location type
Confined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The incident occurred during a temporary shutdown of the distillate hydrotreater.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

DESCRIPTION OF THE HYDROTREATING PROCESS
It aims at removing (approx. 90%) the liquid petroleum fractions contaminants such as nitrogen, sulphur, oxygen, and metals.
The process brings compressed hydrogen to react with organic compounds to remove oxygen (deoxygenation) and other heteroatoms (nitrogen, sulphur, and chlorine).

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Post-event summary

The roof of the distillation tank was damaged.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

According to the ICHEME report (see reference) the following lesson learnt were drawn:
1) Consider training of operators for routes by which storage tanks can erroneously receive unwanted pressure and ensure that facilities and/or procedures prohibit this as far as possible.
2) The pressure of volatile hydrocarbons must always be considered as a possibility in any refinery storage tanks until shown to be otherwise. This is very important when considering dipping and sampling procedures (e.g., adequate relaxation time to dissipate static charge), and when giving clearance for tank entry and repair work.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ICHEME
Reference & weblink

Event description extracted from the UK database ICHEME in PDF

https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/
(accessed October 2020)