Event
- Event ID
- 685
- Quality
- Description
The event affected the hydrocracker unit. A sudden release into a cracker compressor flare header destroyed a safety relief valve and damaged a sight glass on a liquid collection pot. As a consequence, release of hydrogen rich vapour to atmosphere occurred, necessitating a shut down of the iso-cracker.
The damage was limited to that previously described, and there were no injuries. The cracker was returned to service four days later.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- leak no ignition
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- United Kingdom
- Date
- Component involved
- PRD (valve)
- Failure mode
- rupture, no ignition
- Initiating cause
- inadequate or wrong design
- Root CAUSE analysis
According to the ICHEME report (see reference), the INITIATING cause was an accumulation of liquid in the flare header. The problem was compounded by undersized header and piping, and triggered by unstable operating conditions.
Considering the recommendations reported by the ICHEME report, it could be concluded that contributing or root causes were inadequacy of related design and of procedures.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2021
Facility
- Application
- Petrochemical industry
- Sub-application
- Hydrocracking process
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
hydrocracker compressor and valve
- Process temperature range [C]
- ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
- Process pressure range [MPa]
- medium to high pressure (10 to 50 MPa)
- Location type
- Semiconfined
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
As reported by the ICHEME report, the losses were limited to reduced production and repair costs; however, there was a potential threat to life and major equipment.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The following recommendations are reported (ICHEME) as lesson learnt:
1. Drain drip pots frequently to prevent liquid build-up.
2. Locate source(s) of liquid and remedy immediately, when possible, otherwise during the shutdown.
3. Ascertain any testing required for individuals exposed to high levels of noise or hazardous vapours.
4. Redesign the liquid removal system to ensure no build-up.
5. Redesign the flare header to reduce velocity and back pressure.
6. Adjust the operating and emergency procedures to reflect the dangers of rapid feed rate changes.
7. Review the maintenance requirements for compressor alarms and trips.
8. Review the refinery quality control procedures for work done in outside workshops.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- ICHEME
- Reference & weblink
Event description extracted from the UK database ICHEME in PDF
https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/
(accessed October 2020)