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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in the chlorine line of a sodium hydroxide electrolysis unit

Event

Event ID
634
Quality
Description

The incident occurred at a caustic soda electrolysis plant.
A chlorine suction pump failed on a sodium hydroxide electrolysis unit. The arrest of the pump caused the stop of the electrolysis current.
Recovery operations were carried out including nitrogen purging of hydrogen piping and air purging of chlorine piping before starting to add chlorine into the electrolysis vessel. A sudden explosion occurred about 40 minutes later at a chlorine chilling tower and chlorine transfer pipeline.

The cause of the incident was a leak through the valve on the chlorine pipeline. This valve had been correctly closed after the injection of air, but it was leaking. Since the fume removing equipment continued to operate, it created a negative pressure in the chlorine compartment. Therefore, residual hydrogen gas in the cathode cell went into the chlorine pipeline, forming a hydrogen-air explosive gas mixture.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Component involved
valve (generic)
Failure mode
leak & ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (generic)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was the failure of an isolation on the chlorine compartment, which allowed hydrogen to access the chlorine compartment crating a hydrogen-air explosive mixture.
This incident occurred during the recovery work followed a non-hydrogen related emergency.
A contributing factor has been breaking of one of the exchange membranes, due to pressure fluctuations during the shutdown. This was due to the fact the discharge capacity of the water-sealed relief valve was insufficient, causing the pressure inside the electrolysis cell to fluctuate rapidly.

Despite the operational steps undertaken, material failures and lack of diagnostics allowed the occurrence of the explosion. The ROOT CAUSE can be attributed to shortcoming in performing the risk assessment and in designing the related safe procedures.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2020

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

hydrogen pipeline, chlorine pipeline, electrolytic cell,

Process temperature range [C]
Above ambient temperature (50°C to 100°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
unknown
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

A recovery action was ongoing, caused by the arrest of a pump.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2, CL2
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
KHK
Reference & weblink

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association):
https://www.khk.or.jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_inc…
(accessed May 2025)

The first entry in HIAD was comingfrom RISCAD, which is now closed.