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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Hydrogen release from a desulphurisation unit in a refinery

Event

Event ID
601
Quality
Description

The charge pump on a hydro-desulphurissation unit tripped. The charge flow control valve then opened wide on low flow. The high pressure hydrogen supplied to the hydrodesulphurisation unit flowed backwards through a faulty non-return valve to the charge tank.

The tank vents were not designed for this high flow of gas and so the weak roof to the wall seam failed. Fortunately, the gas did not find a source of ignition and so there was no fire. The pump could have failed due to reverse rotation, but did not.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Component involved
valve (non-return)
Failure mode
internal leak
Initiating cause
unknown
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING cause was a mechanical equipment failure

The root cause could be perhaps found in a design or operation cause (failure of proper maintenance or inspection). The safety design did not take into account this type of event sequence. Backflow due to pump or compressor tripping is a well-known mishaps.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/01/2018

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

desulphurisation unit, control valve, pump tank

Process temperature range [C]
ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
medium pressure (2 to 10 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

Tripping of the rector unit

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

According to the ICHEME database, the following measures were requested:

1. To identify all critical non-return valves which could cause a serious incident when failing. These valve have to be repaired to “as new condition” at scheduled shutdowns.

2. To identify the case where reverse flow should not be relied on as the sole means of preventing a serious incident. In those cases, to modify operations in such a way that the flow control valve close any time that the pump tripped.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
ICHEME
Reference & weblink

Event 11049 of the UK database ICHEME
https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/
(accessed September 2020)