Event
- Event ID
- 553
- Quality
- Description
During the start-up of a propylene hydrogenation reactor, very high temperatures were generated in the catalyst bed. At the time, propylene and hydrogen were being fed to the reactor which contained a granular catalyst. The temperature rose rapidly, and the hydrogen supply valve tripped at 176 degrees C. Despite the removal of the reactant supply, the temperature continued to rise to more than 600 degrees C.
Temperature stabilised only after that the reactor had been isolated and depressurised.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- No Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- United Kingdom
- Date
- Component involved
- reactor / oven / furnace / test chamber
- Failure mode
- damage, no release
- Initiating cause
- over-heating (wrong operation)
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE of this incident was over-hydrogenation, which in turn generated sufficiently high temperatures to begin polymerisation of propylene.
The cause of the incident was identified in a wrong setting of the propylene/ hydrogen ratio as a result of faulty calibration of the flow instruments. The excess of hydrogen caused the temperature to rise to the point where spontaneous exothermic polymerization of propylene occurred.
Investigation of the incident was hampered by the loss of the relevant instrument record charts. The wrong calibration and the lack of recording of the process parameters reveals severe shortcoming in the control of the plant operations- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 01/01/2020
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- hydrogenation process
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
insulation of a cold box
- Process temperature range [C]
- Very high temperature (500°C to 1000°C)
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location
- unknown
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Post-event summary
No injury to personnel occurred as a result of this incident and there was no damage to the reactor shell
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The following recommendations were made:
1. Stops should be fitted to key controllers/valves to limit flows in the event of a malfunction.
2. Situations where hydrogenation reactors are isolated or have only low flows through them during commissioning, maintenance or other operations should be identified and avoided.
3. The integrity of the trip system should be improved.
4. Good maintenance procedures are required to avoid the possibility of incorrectly calibrated transmitters being returned to process.
5. All records should be retained for a period, and should and incident occur, all relevant records should be impounded immediately (this last recommendation comes from the fact that the Investigation of the incident was hampered by the loss of the relevant instrument record charts).
In-depth data
- Release type
- no release
- Released amount (kg)
- 0
- Release temperature [°C]
- 600
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- ICHEME
- Reference & weblink
Event nr 9303 of he ICHEME database
https://www.icheme.org/media/7141/causes-chemical-details.pdf
(accessed Dec 2020)