Event
- Event ID
- 506
- Quality
- Description
Vented hydrogen flew back into the system and exploded. Hydrogen was not vented fast enough and exceed the lower flammability limit (4% in volume).
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Component involved
- electrolytic cell
- Failure mode
- internal explosion
- Initiating cause
- inadequate venting
- Root CAUSE analysis
The hydrogen backflow was due to a too high hydrogen production rate, which the venting system could not deal with. This suggests a ROOT CAUSE related to wrong operations. Another causal factor could be speculatively assigned to a vent design not fit for the purpose.
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 28/01/2026
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- Ammonia production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Process temperature range [C]
- ambient temperature (-50°C to +50°C)
- Location type
- Confined
- Location
- unknown
- Operational condition
- UNKNOWN
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 90.000
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2,
Cl2 - Release temperature [°C]
- 25
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Explosion type
References
- Sources categories
- Zalosh
- Reference & weblink
Table II - Industrial Incidents of Appendix A of Zalosh and Short
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENTS
Quarterly Report No. 2 for Period December 1, 1977 - February 28, 1978
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6566131
(accessed September 2020)
