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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in a vent stack of a rocket testing facility

Event

Event ID
431
Quality
Description

During general repair and equipment replacement on a liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen Saturn test facility, a section of the 24-inch GH2 vent line ruptured. An explosion occurred causing extensive damage. The hydrogen vent system from the stage included the vent valve (being removed) which was connected through two flexible lines to the facility vent system. The facility system included a 20-inch vacuum jacketed line from the stage which connected to the 24-inch line leading to a catch tank. From the catch tank, a 36-inch line led to the flare stack. The LH2 tank was pressurized to about 4 psig with helium.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Component involved
venting system (line)
Failure mode
internal explosion
Initiating cause
inadequate or no purge
Root CAUSE analysis

Most probable cause of explosion was a mixture of hydrogen-air at a particular location in the duct. Hydrogen accumulated in the system due to a number of pressurisation and venting cycles with insufficient purging or from leakage of gaseous hydrogen system on stand (2500 psig, 170 bar). The vent system was not purged with high velocity gas and the periodic incremental purge with helium would not necessarily have removed the hydro­gen. Air could have entered the system when the stage vent valve was removed and from an open valve at the base of the catch tank.
Ignition was most likely caused by the flare stack. The combustible mixture was consid­ered to have reached the flare stack and ignited. The flame propagated through the catch tank into the 24-inch diameter vent line and upstream until a mixture and pres­sure were attained which resulted in a detonation.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
01/11/2025

Facility

Application
Non-road vehicles
Sub-application
Aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

vent, flare

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Location type
Confined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The stage tanks were empty of fuels and filled with helium for the repair works

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Emergency action

none

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ORDIN
Reference & weblink

Mishap no 71 in
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)
confidential
(accessed October 2025)

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002