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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Release in chlorate production plant

Event

Event ID
352
Quality
Description

In a plant manufacturing chlorate products, a hydrogen leak occurred via the water drainage outlet onto the factory floor. Pressure in the hydrogen line increased because the hydrogen pipes were filled with water. The situation was rectified by shutting down the process, draining the pipes and by redirecting the hydrogen flow.

Water entered into the hydrogen pipes because the selection switch on the hydrogen compressor had been turned to the 'fresh water' position, and as consequence more water was incorrectly fed into the process. As the intention was to run the compressor in the standard mode, water did not, within the time available, exit the system along the open route; instead, it rose to the hydrogen pipes.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Finland
Date
Component involved
unknown
Failure mode
leak, no ignition
Initiating cause
wrong operation
Root CAUSE analysis

INITIATING CAUSE: a wrong manual operation which caused H2 pipe to become filled with water.
The report does not provide technical details to understand the role of water in the compressor. A possible explanation could be that water was needed for hydraulics safeguards, but this is just an assumption without evident in the report.
ROOT CAUSE: may be deemed to be (i) lack of training, (ii) inadequate instructions. Moreover, an insufficient level of automation or supervision was present because a manual step facilitating a human error was left in the process.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
28/02/2009

Facility

Application
Chemical industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

hydrogen supply line

Process temperature range [C]
Above ambient temperature (50°C to 100°C)
Location type
Confined
Location
industrial area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Property loss (onsite)
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The root cause was an insufficient level of automation, which allowed human error. Risk assessment shall consider this scenario and safety design should provide effective preventing measures.

Corrective Measures

The switch, which had been manually turned into an incorrect position, was removed.
Another upper limit was set that locked the valve controlling the separator level and ensuring that the compressor is stopped.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release temperature [°C]
25
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
Unknown
Reference & weblink

Source lost