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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in a refinery

Event

Event ID
229
Quality
Description

The event occurred at a reactor for the polymerisation of ethylene. An exothermic runaway reaction took place, which decomposed ethylene into carbon, hydrogen and methane.
The Automatic dump valves (blow-off valves) on the feeding line operated and released the ethylene and its decomposition products through the stacks to the atmosphere. The released gas cloud was probably ignited by the hot carbon particles obtained by the decomposition of the ethylene and exploded.

The explosion caused structural damages to the surrounding plants.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Component involved
reactor / oven / furnace / test chamber
Failure mode
correct activation & venting
Initiating cause
run-away reaction
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING CAUSE was an exothermic runaway decomposition which caused a pressure increase in the reactor with consequent venting of ethylene and its decomposition products.

The reasons for the decomposition of ethylene are not explicitly provided. However, it is reported that the automatic isolation valves on the reactor were not fast enough to prevent more unused ethylene entering the reactor. The released gas was ignited because the automatic water quenching system operated but failed to prevent the aerial ignition. This was due to a quenching system design not appropriate.
The ROOT CAUSE could be attributed to inadequate system design, unable to control he reaction and to properly handle consequences.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
28/02/2009

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
polyethylene production unit
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

polymerization reactor, exhasut valves, quenching system

Process temperature range [C]
High temperature (100°C to 500°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
industrial area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

Polymerization of ethylene was carried out in a 750 litres pressurized 19 years old reactor in a polyethylene plant of a petrochemical factory.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances

BASIC DESCRIPTIONF OT THE PROCESS
The process affected by the event was the production of polyethylene, a polymer of ethylene, the most common plastic.
Ethylene (IUPAC name ethene) is a gaseous hydrocarbon with formula C2H4. Polymerisation of ethylene to polyethylene occurs according to the following formula:
n CH2=CH2 (gas) → [−CH2−CH2−]n (solid).
A catalyst is used, for example titanium chloride or metal oxides.

Depending on the final product, there are two production processes:
High-Pressure Process at a Pressure of 100–300 MPa and a temperature of 200–300 °C.
Low-Pressure Process at a Pressure of 1–8 MPa and a temperature of 70–300 °C,
The plant involved in the event was probably based on a low-pressure process for the production of LDPE (low-density polyethylene).

Runaway reaction caused by the decomposition of ethylene are reported in the scientific literature as consequence of too high temperature and/or pressure, and in presence of too high oxygen concentrations.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
Euro
Property loss (onsite)
2.000.000
Post-event summary

60 kg of ethylene were released, unknown if all combusted.

Emergency action

The water quenching system automatically operated but it failed to prevent the aerial ignition of the released gas. The intervention of automatic isolation valves on the reactor were not fast enough to prevent more unused ethylene entering the reactor and therefore to feed the aerial explosion. Automatic dump valves on the feeding line operated 2 seconds to dump residual ethylene to atmosphere resulting also in feeding the aerial explosion.

Emergency evaluation

The water quenching system automatically operated but it failed to prevent the aerial ignition of the released gas. The intervention of automatic isolation valves on the reactor were not fast enough to prevent more unused ethylene entering the reactor and therefore to feed the aerial explosion.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

After the accident, the following measures were established:
1- to use new smart sensors to speed up the reactor isolation and, therefore, to reduce the amount of gas released;
2- to vent ethylene to a separate, contained system or increase considerably the delay before the automatic dumping of the lines contents.

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
C2H4
H2
CH4
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
eMARS
Reference & weblink

Event description in the European database eMARS
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/emars/accident/view/c1689f9d-1b3a-870…
(accessed September 2020)

Event no. 6189 in the French database ARIA,
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/6189_en/?lang=en,
(accessed October 2020)

A memory of the event 30 years later is available at Erlensee Aktuell:
https://www.erlensee-aktuell.com/2021/10/05/blick-zurueck-wasserstoff-e…
(accessed Dec 2024)