Event
- Event ID
- 113
- Quality
- Description
A liquid hydrogen tanker was en route on the highway when the driver noticed a vapour plume in the rear-view mirror. The driver exited the highway and stopped at the first available safe location. Upon inspection of the cargo, the driver noticed that the pressure in the inner vessel of the double-walled tank had risen above 3.45 barg (50 psig), causing the opening of the safety relief valve. Later, a thorough inspection revealed a leak in the annular space vacuum relief plate, leading to a loss of vacuum. That failure increased the heat transfer to the cryogenic hydrogen, consequently increasing vaporisation.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- release, no ignition
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Component involved
- PRD (valve)
- Failure mode
- correct activation
- Initiating cause
- over-pressurisation (thermal insulation degradation)
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was a loss of vacuum of he insulation shell of the liquid hydrogen tank.
The safety measured worked as expected by releasing hydrogen at the set pressure through the Pressure Relief Valve .
- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 25/08/2024
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen transport and distribution
- Sub-application
- H2 delivery to customers
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
LH2 road tanker
- Process temperature range [C]
- cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
- Process pressure range [MPa]
- low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
- Location type
- Open
- Location
- highway or similar
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Property loss (onsite)
- 0
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
This is an example of a correct mitigation of a mechanical failure. On a liquid hydrogen tank, the function of the Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) is to release hydrogen vapour, when the tank internal pressure increase due to the evaporation of liquid hydrogen. The reduction of the insulation capacity of the tank accelerated the evaporation rate and the PRD released more vapour. In this way, the internal pressure of the tank remained below the maximal allowed value.
Unfortunately, the source does not report the actions taken by the drivers before restarting the travel. In absence of any action, at constant inward heat flow, the PRV will continue opening and closing till the LH2 tank empties. If the flow increases, it may happen that the PRV is not able anymore to release the pressure, which will increase up to the value at which the burst disc will open, accelerating the emptying.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release pressure [MPa]
- 0.345
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- PHMSA
- Reference & weblink
Event incident ID I-1996071466 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996), https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages (accessed September 2024)
A. Jimenez, C. Groth, Hazards associated with pressure relief devices in hydrogen systems, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 91 (2024), 105380, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2024.105380