Event
- Event ID
- 76
- Quality
- Description
A liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling back to the base terminal after having delivered at a customer site. Almost arrived to the end of the journey, the tanker started to vent. The drivers pulled over and checked pressure gauges, reading a 55 lbs value (probably 3.8 barg). The hydrogen vapour vented for about 1 minute and stopped when the pressure was at 38 lbs (probably 2.6 barg). The drivers proceeded to the base terminal. Once there, the inspection determined that the tanker had lost insulation capacity to vacuum deterioration.
The tanker was warmed up with warm gas and purged with inert nitrogen and sent to another company site for testing. There they found that the external shell of the tank was not able to maintain the required vacuum quality. The tanker was then transported to company headquarter for further diagnosis and repair before returning to service.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- leak no ignition
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Component involved
- PRD (valve)
- Failure mode
- correct activation & venting
- Initiating cause
- over-pressurisation (thermal insulation degradation)
- Root CAUSE analysis
INITIAL CAUSE was the deterioration of the vacuum between the inner vessel and outer vessel of the LH2 tank on the trailer, wit consequence loss of thermal isolation ability and over-pressurisation of the tank.
ROOT CAUSE: additional information of the reasons for the loss of vacuum is not provided.
- Root causes
- Unknown
- Date entry in HIAD
- 31/12/2024
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen transport and distribution
- Sub-application
- LH2 tanker
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
vacuum thermal insulation
- Process temperature range [C]
- cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
- Process pressure range [MPa]
- low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
- Location type
- Open
- Location
- highway or similar
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
The tank was almost empty after delivery. The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) ,
The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) , but to the hydrogen gas left in the tank before venting. .
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 10
- Post-event summary
A loss of 1130 GCF is reportd, which probably corresponds to 2.9 kg
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
This incident is very similar to other, such as the HIAD_070, which attributed to road vibrations the opening of the vapour return valve.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release pressure [MPa]
- 0.36
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
References
- Sources categories
- PHMSA
- Reference & weblink
Event incident ID I-1991090456 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages
(accessed September 2024)