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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Safety venting from a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
74
Quality
Description

A full liquid hydrogen tanker left the home terminal with a internal pressure of 6 psig. Throughout the trip, drivers experienced nothing other than normal conditions. 12 hours later, at a scale, the tank pressure reading was 11 psig. When the driver checked the unit again approximately one hour later, the pressure had climbed at 28 psig causing hydrogen to be vented.
They notified the home terminal and were advised to proceed to a nearby plant of the company to stabilize the pressure in the tank. They accomplished this and proceeded on to the delivery site with no further problems.
On subsequent trips, this tanker did not experience no abnormal pressure conditions. Therefore, the abnormal pressure rise could only be attributed to drivers' failure to properly stabilise the load before departing.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
leak no ignition
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Component involved
LH2 tank (road tanker)
Failure mode
manual venting
Initiating cause
over-pressurisation (wrong operation)
Root CAUSE analysis

The INITIATING cause of the hydrogen venting was an increase of the tank internal pressure.

The ROOT CAUSE was attributed to a shortcoming in following the stabilisation procedure of the liquid load before starting the journey.

Root causes
Date entry in HIAD
31/12/2024

Facility

Application
Hydrogen transport and distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

Vent

Process temperature range [C]
cryogenic temperature (below -50°C)
Process pressure range [MPa]
low to medium pressure (below 2 MPa)
Location type
Open
Location
highway or similar
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
320
Post-event summary

PHMSA reports a loss of hydrogen comparable to the total quantity transported, not coherent with the narrative which speaks only of a stabilisation of the pressure. This could hint at an empty tank after delivery, but this journey started at the company plant for hydrogen production and liquefaction, so it is to be assumed that it was full load when it started the journey.

In-depth data

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release pressure [MPa]
0.14
Probable IGNITION SOURCE

References

Sources categories
PHMSA
Reference & weblink

Event incident ID I-1992020529 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages
(accessed September 2024)