Event
- Event ID
- 69
- Quality
- Description
This incident occurred at a waste water tank of an unspecified chemical plant. An explosive atmosphere formed inside the wastewater tank due to the accidental production of hydrogen. This occurred either during wastewater treatment or due to the reaction of excess sodium borohydride from the remaining wastewater in the tank with additional wastewater added to the tank later.
The hydrogen-air explosive atmosphere was forced through an overflow pipe and through a water seal and released into the surrounding area, where it was ignited by manual work. Subsequently, a flashback occurred through the overflow pipe into the wastewater tank, resulting in an explosion which destroyed the tank.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- Germany
- Date
- Component involved
- chemical storage tank (waste)
- Failure mode
- rupture & ignition
- Initiating cause
- accidental hydrogen formation
- Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was an accidental formation of hydrogen by a chemical reaction.
The ROOT CAUSE was the lack of effective monitoring and control of the process values, specifically the lack of pH adjustment during filling of the wastewater tank. This hint at shortcoming of the operative procedures, of risk assessment and/or of proper training of operators.- Root causes
- Date entry in HIAD
- 28/02/2009
Facility
- Application
- Chemical industry
- Sub-application
- waste management
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
water seal,
oveflow pipe, sodium borohydride tank- Location type
- Open
- Location
- industrial area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Number of injured persons
- 13
- Currency
- Euro
- Property loss (onsite)
- 1.000.000
- Post-event summary
The tank and othe plant componets were destroyed by the explosion and subsequent fire.
- Emergency action
The alarm was triggered manually by a push-button.
The area was evacuated, and the combustion products were suppressed by the fire department with a water spray.
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
As preventive measure, the wastewater treatment process was modified.
As control measures, (i) a HAZOP analysis of wastewater treatment was implemented and wastewater flows were monitored.
In-depth data
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Probable IGNITION SOURCE
- Explosion type
References
- Sources categories
- ZEMA
- Reference & weblink
Event from German database ZEMA
https://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/de/site/2854/zema/index/3223.html
(accessed December 2024)