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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion of hydrogen and gas oil with subsequent fire at a refinery

Event

Event ID
50
Quality
Description

The incident occurred at a heat exchanger involving gas-product mixture. The source does not specify the process, with as main component a furnace, probably a hydrodesulphurisation reactor. Due to a leak in the pipe, the mixture was released and formed a vapour cloud. Following ignition, a fire developed at the leaking point.
The plant fire brigade was alerted and laid a foam carpet over the entire area. The furnace system, the as circulation compressor and the injection pump were switched off in an emergency. The emergency expansion valve was opened and nitrogen was fed into the circuit.
No injuries, only equipment damage.

Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Germany
Date
Component involved
heat exchanger (pipe)
Failure mode
leak & ignition
Initiating cause
material degradation (generic)
Root CAUSE analysis

A material failure was suspected to as INITIATING CAUSE of the leak. Nothing is known on the operative aspects of the event.

Root causes
Unknown
Date entry in HIAD
28/02/2009

Facility

Application
Petrochemical industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected

pipe, heat exchangeer

Process temperature range [C]
High temperature (100°C to 500°C)
Location type
Unknown
Location
industrial area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of fatalities
0
Number of injured persons
0
Currency
Euro
Property loss (onsite)
500.000
Post-event summary

There were no personal injuries. The property damage due to partial destruction of equipment as a result of the fire amounted to 500,000 euros. There was no environmental damage.

Emergency action

The plant fire brigade was alerted and laid a foam carpet over the entire area. As safety measures, the furnace system, the as circulation compressor and the injection pump were switched off in an emergency. The emergency expansion valve was opened and nitrogen was fed into the circuit. No intervention outside the plant was required.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

A revision and expansion of the wall thickness measuring programs, to be able to detect on time critical loos of resistance and percent loss of confinement.

In-depth data

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2S 10 kg
H2 100 kg
Hydrocarbons 1200 kg
Probable IGNITION SOURCE
Explosion type

References

Sources categories
ZEMA
Reference & weblink

Event from German database ZEMA
https://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/de/site/12981/zema/index/2869.html
(accessed December 2023)